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Glossary

Every participant, object and principle of the protocol, defined in the words of the specification.

Participants
33
Objects
41
Principles
11

Terms

Every term, A to Z.

Admission scope key Object
Admission is keyed by provider, artifact digest or version, capability or profile, jurisdiction, purpose and qualification revision; one scope never qualifies another.
AI and model operator Participant
Admits a model version, reviews rights, security and competence evidence, assigns bounded tool entitlements, watches drift and can suspend, revoke or replace a model.
Applications and data consumers Participant
Machine consumers that obtain typed contracts, authenticate with scoped identity, send a request context, use safe repetition, subscribe to correction-aware events and export lawful formats; consumption APIs are not a management plane.
Assurance reviewer Participant
Traces a claim back through requirements, implementation, configuration, tests, observations, incidents and corrections, and distinguishes self-test, integration verification, independent assessment and external acceptance.
Attestation evidence Object
Measured-boot, device, workload and runtime evidence, bound to device identity, firmware and software versions, measurement time, format, verifier policy, nonce and revocation lineage.
Attestation result Object
The verifier's scoped appraisal result that gates identity issue, secrets and workloads.
Attestation verifier Participant
Appraises attester evidence against reference values, endorsements and appraisal policy and issues a scoped attestation result that gates workloads and secrets.
Authority lease Object
The bounded offline authority a site holds during disconnection, with staleness rules, reconciliation algorithm and prohibited commands.
Bootstrap authority Participant
Receives the attestation result, asks policy about enrolment and returns node identity, trust bundle and a signed bootstrap plan.
Calibration record Object
The calibration history and measurement uncertainty bound to a sensor passport.
Capability state vector Object
Separate dimensions for implementation, service, verification, operational, release, claim and correction state.
Claim ceiling Object
The highest claim an artifact may make given its evidence. Code and CI may promote only evidence-backed engineering states; reserved status words need the matching external or independent authority.
Cluster Participant
An optional scale or specialisation domain for scheduling, shared storage, accelerators or data locality. Membership never erases node or site identity and policy boundaries.
Connector runtime Participant
Admits data sources and lands native source evidence with response, retrieval context, rights, timestamps, identifiers, checksums and parsing version; it never writes directly into products, map truth or agent conclusions.
Controlled release record Object
Binds source commit, artifact digests, SBOM and provenance, deployment plan digest, profile, provider versions, migrations, policy bundle, test dossier, limitations, rollback plan, correction endpoint and allowed claims.
Correction notice Object
The record that marks a product, proof, observation, qualification or publication as disputed, superseded, withdrawn or recalled, and propagates through the dependency graph.
Correction without erasure Principle
Records are correction-addressable. Replacement never deletes history.
deployment plan Object
The signed, versioned deployment-composition contract. It declares required capabilities and policy, not a fixed bill of materials.
deployment plan compiler Participant
Resolves a signed deployment plan against the provider and capability registry and policy, in deterministic phases, into an immutable plan. Compilation is analysis, not execution.
Deployment profile Object
One of 21 target-state profiles (Nano, Wedge, Field, Earth, Industrial, Private Wireless, AI-RAN, DePIN Hotspot, Mesh Gateway, Scientific, Autonomous, Mobile, Air-Gapped, a client-controlled profile, Campus, Regional, National, Federated, Cloud, Hybrid, Research), each declaring topology, authority, locality, trust, key custody, offline behaviour, service levels, update path, rollback, support boundary and exit.
Developer Participant
Reads contracts, uses SDKs, runs fail-closed validation and fixtures, records evidence and opens bounded changes; tooling exposes no administrative bypass.
Each step is its own evidence Principle
Installation is not qualification; qualification is not observation; observation is not assessment. No state is reached by wording.
Event envelope Object
The canonical event wrapper; delivery is at least once, so consumers are safe to repeat by event id and aggregate.
Evidence record Object
An immutable-by-version, correction-aware record in one of sixteen evidence classes, from source evidence and build provenance to independent assessment and institutional acceptance.
Federation Participant
An exchange of products, capabilities, events or work across approved, independently administered trust domains, using explicit trust, policy, data-locality, version and correction contracts. It is not a global synchronous quorum.
Federation binding Object
The record of an approved federation relationship, alongside membership, sync cursors, conflict records and partition observations.
Field and mobile user Participant
Works under approved disconnected constraints with cached products, creates locally durable records and reconciles conflicts on reconnection.
Fleet controller Participant
Coordinates plans, acknowledgements, convergence evidence, update campaigns and correction propagation across nodes and sites. It is a coordination service, not a global command authority or hidden quorum, and leaves local apply authority to the node agent.
Fleet operator Participant
Sees sites, intended plans, rollout waves, delivery, acknowledgements, correction impacts, stale sites and evidence freshness; must see blast radius and rollback before authorizing a rollout, and cannot bypass local trust.
Fleet projection Object
The site projection derived from governed deployment-state events, keeping desired and observed versions, connectivity, sync, freshness and correction separate. Not acceptance or availability authority.
governed data store Participant
Owns governed data, provenance, quality, fusion, uncertainty and risk products; provider payloads are never written directly to products.
Hardware passport Object
The record of a node's hardware, components, firmware set, bill of materials, thermal and power envelopes and attestation evidence.
Hardware providers Participant
Makers of servers, rugged edge systems, radios, accelerators, storage, timing sources, sensors and other components. No brand is admitted globally; admission is scoped to exact products, firmware and versions, profiles, rights and tests.
Independent assessor Participant
The assessor, client or competent authority that alone can accept an assessment where external acceptance is required.
Independent verifier Participant
Checks signed proof receipts from peers before metering; verification does not invent authority.
Instruments, sensors and devices Participant
Arbitrary qualified sensors and instruments whose measurements are ingested with calibration, units, geometry, time, custody and uncertainty; each sensor has a passport and calibration record.
Local first, offline is not policy-free Principle
Approved local operation MUST continue through loss of upstream links for the autonomy window in the plan. Expired authority, revoked identity, compromised time or missing mandatory evidence MUST force quarantine even offline.
Map grounding receipt Object
The receipt that binds a map paint to a governed product, geometry, time context, evidence and policy; without it a map shows a labelled non-authoritative view.
Model manifest Object
The admitted model record with digest, format, runtime candidates, rights, evaluation profile, prohibited uses and rollback artifact.
Native source evidence Object
The landed provider response with acquisition context, content digest, media type, rights and correction state, preserved before any transformation.
Network intent Object
A provider-neutral connectivity intent; reachability is not service fitness and wall-clock presence is not PNT trust.
No dependency on another party Principle
A conforming deployment MUST be operable by its owner without any service, data or approval from another organisation, unless the owner chooses to federate.
Node Participant
The minimum useful deployable unit: server, rugged appliance, radio node, sensor gateway, satellite terminal, AI, scientific, vehicle or virtual node. After enrolment it has a durable Node UNI, hardware and software passports, local identity, policy cache, runtime, evidence buffer, telemetry, update state and one or more node roles.
Node agent Participant
The minimum trusted local control component on a node. It inventories hardware, establishes machine identity, collects platform evidence, validates the compiled plan, enforces local policy, reconciles only within delegated authority, records observed state and keeps local continuity when disconnected. It is not a public-authority command system.
Node bootstrap bundle Object
The bounded enrolment and assignment envelope that references plan, deployment, site, policy and attestation requirements. It does not authorize plan execution or site acceptance.
Node identity and manifest Object
A durable Node UNI issued only after approved evidence and policy evaluation, with the node manifest that lists its site, hardware passport, runtime profile, roles, capabilities and state vector. Node and workload identities are short-lived, scoped and renewable.
Node role Object
One of 37 provider-neutral role declarations a node can take, each requiring identity, capabilities, health, runtime, interfaces, policy, evidence and qualification; roles can coexist and are declared in the deployment plan.
Observation record Object
One observed value of a property by a system, with result time and evidence references, and optional phenomenon and valid time, geometry, unit, uncertainty and quality flags.
Observed-state receipt Object
The node-emitted receipt of what it actually observed after preflight, apply and verification, with time integrity and digests; evidence, not a fleet command.
One owner per fact Principle
Each fact family has exactly one authoritative owner. A site MAY cache and continue bounded state; it MUST NOT become a silent second source of truth.
Open change process Participant
Keeps the Observatory Protocol open: public specification, change process and conformance.
Peer node Participant
A node that advertises, provides and verifies connectivity, compute, storage, sensing or inference services over peer networks, without token economics as a prerequisite.
Plan reconciler Participant
Compares desired plan with observed state and proposes a convergence set; it never invokes external actuators and must not auto-substitute a provider or model where that changes validity, radio authorization, data rights, safety case or contract terms.
Policy bundle Object
The local policy bundle with purpose, jurisdiction, classification and authority constraints pinned at POLICY_BOUND, identified by bundle id and digest.
Product confidence and status and reliance class Object
Every product states whether it is observed, computed, modelled, provisional, degraded, no data, insufficient evidence, not applicable, withheld or superseded, and the reliance it supports.
Product manifest Object
The definition of a governed product: owner, inputs, state model, outputs and correction policy.
Product steward Participant
Defines stable product identity, product manifest, inputs, method, confidence and status, uncertainty, reliance, correction behaviour and export contract; product status derives from these dependencies.
Products keep their context Principle
Every value carries provenance, time, uncertainty, quality, confidence and correction state.
Proof receipt Object
A signed statement of exactly what was challenged, measured or attested (identity, location, coverage, connectivity, uptime, compute, sensing, time integrity and others), with a result of pass, fail, inconclusive or expired.
Provenance and lineage Object
Provenance statements for artifacts and lineage edges for data, so every deployed artifact and product traces to owner, build or acquisition evidence, licence and correction state.
Provider manifest Object
The authored declaration a provider makes: class, adapter, version policy, capabilities, rights, security and exit.
Provider or integrator Participant
Submits a provider declaration, artifact identity, rights, security, support and portability evidence and adapter conformance results; sees missing prerequisites but cannot self-promote to admitted status.
Provider registry Participant
Holds provider admission state for deployment composition: candidate registration, manifest validation, evidence attachment, qualification, policy admission, suspension, revocation, requalification and replacement planning. It references, not duplicates, platform-owned truth.
Qualification record Object
An evidence-backed assessment of one provider artifact, version and profile for a declared scope, with a result of pass, fail, conditional or expired.
Quality flags and uncertainty Object
Quality flags travel with each observation as a list of strings next to an uncertainty object; quality and uncertainty are measured before data reaches the governed data authority.
Reconciliation receipt Object
The record of one bounded local reconciliation with preflight, apply, verification and observed digests.
Regulators and competent authorities Participant
Hold legal, spectrum, regulatory, emergency, financial, safety and official public decisions; jurisdiction overlays are chosen by use case and location.
Replaceable providers Principle
Hardware, software, cloud, radio, satellite, model, data and service providers are replaceable behind typed contracts, with a tested exit path.
Replay batch Object
The store-and-forward batch a node sends on reconnection; event identities are never rewritten, and conflicts stay explicit and are not acknowledged.
Request context Object
The context every cross-authority request carries; a consequential request fails closed when it is incomplete.
Risk, science, GIS and EO analysts Participant
Use provenance-aware data with method and model versions, uncertainty, contradictory evidence and correction lineage; no-data and insufficient-evidence conditions stay distinguishable from low values.
SBOM and provenance statement Object
Software and model bills of materials, provenance, signatures and transparency receipts for every deployed artifact.
Scoped proof Principle
A proof proves only the claim and scope in its evidence.
Separated planes Principle
Control, data, evidence and exchange planes are separate. The exchange plane MUST NOT create an inbound management path into a site.
Signed plan Object
The immutable, governed deployment proposal produced by the compiler, with digest and correction lineage. Planning is not execution, acceptance, readiness or field observation.
Site Participant
The minimum independently operable local governance and failure domain: one or more nodes plus local network, identity, policy, evidence, storage, products and operator surfaces. It declares what keeps running offline, its offline authority lease, staleness thresholds and which commands become unavailable.
Site operator Participant
Sees independent node trust, connectivity, plan, service and evidence states, performs only authorized local actions, works through central disconnection and exports evidence bundles.
Software, cloud, model and data providers Participant
Operating systems, runtimes, cloud services, radio stacks, models, libraries and data services. They enter through the same manifest and admission lifecycle and must keep a replacement class and exit path.
Source manifest Object
The declaration of a data source with authority, distribution, rights state, schema state and admission state.
Source steward Participant
Registers a source manifest with rights and responsibility context, profiles it, runs connector qualification, handles source changes and corrections and can suspend the source.
Time and position quality Object
Clock and PNT integrity modelled as evidence: offset, source loss, holdover and conflicting sources. Events produced while timing is degraded carry that condition, and dependants consume TimeQuality and PositionQuality rather than assume clock or GNSS validity.
Typed, receipted commands Principle
Every consequential command carries identity, purpose, policy, authority, repeat-safe key and a receipt.
Version watch event Object
An evidence feed entry for a newer upstream version with its disposition; no dependency upgrades itself.
Wedge node Participant
The establishment profile that creates an observatory from little or no infrastructure: boots from signed media, inventories and attests hardware, establishes local identity, discovers links, enrols providers, forms encrypted peer links, accepts a signed deployment plan and emits an evidence bundle; it can stay alone or recruit more nodes.
Zero implicit trust Principle
A participant starts untrusted. Trust is earned by attestation, admission and evidence, and lapses on expiry or revocation.