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Observatory ProtocolNode registryFederation peer

Federation peer

A cluster or site cell that exchanges with another trust domain under a federation binding. No binding, no exchange.

Version
0.1.0-draft
Status
Draft specification
Specification
CC BY 4.0
Code
Apache-2.0
Steward
GCRI Canada
Source
obsp-0.1-foundation

Role

Federation peer role. (OBSP 0.1 §3) Federation is asynchronous exchange under an explicit binding. (OBSP 0.1 §5.7)

Class
Compute, relay and control
Edge computers, relays, site cell controllers, clusters and federation peers.
Protocol role
FED_PEER Federation peer. (OBSP 0.1 §3)
Conformance profile
OBSP-GRID Cluster and grid control plane (OBSP 0.1 §7.1)

Interfaces

The planes and bindings this type uses. Bindings are normative for OBSP 0.1; radio and link layers follow their own standards. (OBSP 0.1 §6)

InterfaceBindingSources
FederationAsynchronous exchange under a federation binding and authority lease(OBSP 0.1 §5.7)
TransportQUIC may be used on lossy links(OBSP 0.1 §6)

Schemas it emits and accepts

Each document is a JSON Schema 2020-12 contract. Open one in the schema explorer. (JSON Schema 2020-12) Every request, command and event also carries a request context. (OBSP 0.1 §4.3)

Emits

Accepts

Lifecycle and conformance

OBSP-GRID 12 of 12 functions. (OBSP 0.1 §7.1) A level is reached only with the evidence it names. (OBSP 0.1 §7.2)

5.1Join5.2Admit5.3Describe5.4Time5.5Observe5.6Qualify5.7Federate5.8Orchestrate5.9Correct5.10Exchange5.11Prove5.12Exit and decommission
The twelve stages of the lifecycle. The stages in the type's profile are marked.

Conformance cases that apply

CaseWhat it testsKindEvidence
CT-GRID-001Federate: fleet projection across cellsschemafleet-projection
CT-GRID-002Exchange: product manifests published to consumersschemaproduct-manifest
CT-GRID-003Orchestrate: system packs compiled into reconciliation assignmentsschemasystem-pack reconciliation-assignment
CT-NODE-001Join: node manifest, attestation evidence and the verifier's resultinvariantnode-manifest attestation-evidence attestation-result request-context
CT-NODE-002Join: bootstrap bundle received from the site cellschemanode-bootstrap-bundle
CT-NODE-003Describe: sensor passports and the calibration records they citeinvariantsensor-passport calibration-record
CT-NODE-004Time: time quality reported as explicit stateinvarianttime-quality
CT-NODE-005Observe: observation records and event envelopesschemaobservation-record event-envelope
CT-NODE-006Observe: store and forward replay with its resultschemareplay-batch replay-batch-result
CT-NODE-007Qualify: quality flags and provenance travel with valuesschemaquality-flag provenance
CT-NODE-008Orchestrate: a signed plan applied with a reconciliation receiptschemaplan reconciliation-receipt observed-state-receipt
CT-NODE-009Exit: decommission with revoked identities and a full exportinvariantdecommission-record
CT-SITE-001Admit: sources admitted by manifest and qualification recordschemasource-manifest qualification-record
CT-SITE-002Correct: correction notices supersede with a new digestinvariantcorrection-notice
CT-SITE-003Prove: proof receipts for the local verifier roleschemaproof-receipt

Run these cases in the onboarding check

Levels

Declared
Signed self-declaration naming profile, version and scope.
Self-tested
Conformance report (obsp conformance run) produced by the participant, with digests of the tested artifacts.
Lab-tested
Conformance report (obsp conformance run) and lab test record from a qualified lab.
Qualified
Lab report plus field observation for the declared scope and a qualification-record.
Suspended
Suspension notice with reason.
Withdrawn
Withdrawal notice.

Identity, attestation and security

Requirements of the join function and of the security model. (OBSP 0.1 §5.1; OBSP 0.1 §8) Attestation follows the RATS architecture, passport model. (IETF RFC 9334 §5.1)

  • A node MUST present attestation evidence (RATS, RFC 9334, passport model) rooted in a hardware root of trust where the device class has one (TPM 2.0, DICE or a secure element), or a software root explicitly marked SOFTWARE_ROOT otherwise. (OBSP 0.1 §5.1)
  • A verifier MUST bind the result to a nonce and an expiry. (OBSP 0.1 §5.1)
  • Identity MUST be short-lived and renewable (X.509 SVID, SPIFFE-style URI spiffe://<trust-domain>/node/<uni>). (OBSP 0.1 §5.1)
  • Long-lived shared secrets MUST NOT be used. (OBSP 0.1 §5.1)
  • The bootstrap bundle MUST be signed by the site cell's enrolment key and carry the trust anchors, policy reference and the first plan digest. (OBSP 0.1 §5.1)

Root-of-trust classes the attestation evidence schema accepts: TPM2, DICE, SECURE_ELEMENT, SOFTWARE_ROOT. (OBSP 0.1 §5.1)

A hardware root follows TPM 2.0 or DICE where the device class has one. (TCG TPM 2.0; TCG DICE)

Architecture
Zero trust (NIST SP 800-207): every request is authenticated, authorised and logged; network position grants nothing (OBSP 0.1 §8)
Device identity
Attested; hardware root where the class has one; short-lived certificates; revocation within the site cell's offline window (OBSP 0.1 §8)
Workload identity
SPIFFE-style SVIDs, rotated; no shared secrets (OBSP 0.1 §8)
Keys
Site cell keys held by the grid operator; customer-held keys for upstream services; HSM or TPM-sealed where available (OBSP 0.1 §8)
Supply chain
SBOM, SLSA provenance, signed artifacts, TUF update metadata, SUIT for firmware (OBSP 0.1 §8)
Time
Authenticated time (P3, §5.4); time integrity gates receipts (OBSP 0.1 §8)
OT environments
IEC 62443 zones and conduits for industrial deployments (OBSP 0.1 §8)
Privacy
Observation data that can identify a person is a declared data class with its own policy; default is not to collect it (OBSP 0.1 §8)

Interoperability profile and standards

The primary standards this type draws on. Alignment with a standard is stated as alignment. It is not an approval by the standards body. (OBSP 0.1 §13)

Not yet defined

What the protocol does not define for this type in version 0.1, stated as the specification states it. Nothing here is filled in from elsewhere.

  • The federation binding, the authority lease and the peer protocol have no contract in OBSP 0.1 (G-FED-1). (OBSP 0.1 §9)
  • G-FED-1 FederationBinding and AuthorityLease schemas and the peer exchange protocol (Federate). (OBSP 0.1 §9)
  • G-ORCH-1 Plan signing path and TUF update metadata (Orchestrate). (OBSP 0.1 §9)
  • G-EXCH-1 Observation, product and catalogue read APIs and OGC endpoints (Exchange). (OBSP 0.1 §9)
  • G-PROVE-1 Proof challenge protocol and verifier service (Prove). (OBSP 0.1 §9)

Across the consortium

Related pages on the consortium's other networks, in their own words.

StandardsNexus Standards
Open standards to identify, describe, verify and cite risk information, which observations bound by the protocol can carry.Early Warning and Anticipatory ActionHazards and Disaster Risk ReductionCommunities, Learning and ContributionIndustry, Trade and Supply ChainsData and EvidenceClimate and Earth SystemsEnergy and Critical Infrastructure
IndexThe Global Risks Index
Country risk indicators that observations with provenance and quality can inform.risksindex.com
AcademyRisk Academy
Training for implementers and operators of observing systems.risksacademy.com
ReportsReports at Nexus Standards
Published evidence with provenance, citation and corrections.nexustandards.com/nexus-reports

References

Sources cited on this page, in order of first citation. Addresses were last checked on the date shown.

  1. OBSP 0.1 §3: Participant roles Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
  2. OBSP 0.1 §5.7: Federate Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
  3. OBSP 0.1 §7.1: Profiles Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
  4. OBSP 0.1 §6: Wire bindings Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
  5. JSON Schema 2020-12 JSON Schema draft 2020-12 json-schema.org/draft/2020-12 Checked
  6. OBSP 0.1 §4.3: Request context Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
  7. OBSP 0.1 §7.2: Conformance levels Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
  8. OBSP 0.1 §5.1: Join Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
  9. OBSP 0.1 §8: Security model Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
  10. IETF RFC 9334 Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334.html Checked
  11. TCG TPM 2.0 Trusted Platform Module Library Specification trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-specification/ Checked
  12. TCG DICE Device Identifier Composition Engine architectures trustedcomputinggroup.org/work-groups/dice-architectures/ Checked
  13. OBSP 0.1 §13: Sovereign deployment for every operator and environment Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
  14. 3GPP TS 23.501 System architecture for the 5G System www.3gpp.org/dynareport/23501.htm Checked
  15. ETSI MEC Multi-access Edge Computing www.etsi.org/technologies/multi-access-edge-computing Checked
  16. OBSP 0.1 §9: Gaps register Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.