Observatory ProtocolNode registrySite cell controller (hub)
Site cell controller (hub)
The local authority of a site: identity, policy, plan and buffer for its nodes. It runs offline for the autonomy window in the plan and verifies local evidence.
- Version
- 0.1.0-draft
- Status
- Draft specification
- Specification
- CC BY 4.0
- Code
- Apache-2.0
- Steward
- GCRI Canada
- Source
- obsp-0.1-foundation
Role
Site cell controller role. (OBSP 0.1 §3) Approved local operation continues through loss of upstream links. (OBSP 0.1 §2) The bootstrap bundle is signed by the site cell's enrolment key. (OBSP 0.1 §5.1)
- Class
- Compute, relay and control
Edge computers, relays, site cell controllers, clusters and federation peers. - Protocol role
SITE_CELLSite cell controller. (OBSP 0.1 §3)- Conformance profile
OBSP-SITESite cell controller. In this profile, admit is local admission of nodes and sources; prove is the local verifier role (OBSP 0.1 §7.1)- Technology domains
- Edge hardware and runtime, Field deployment and operations
Interfaces
The planes and bindings this type uses. Bindings are normative for OBSP 0.1; radio and link layers follow their own standards. (OBSP 0.1 §6)
| Interface | Binding | Sources |
|---|---|---|
| Control | Site cell to node and cluster to site cell over TLS 1.3 with mutual authentication | (OBSP 0.1 §6) |
| Site to upstream | At-least-once publication with idempotency keys over the control channel or NATS JetStream | (OBSP 0.1 §6) |
| Evidence | DSSE-signed in-toto statements, SLSA provenance and SCITT transparency receipts | (OBSP 0.1 §6; in-toto; SLSA 1.0; IETF SCITT) |
Schemas it emits and accepts
Each document is a JSON Schema 2020-12 contract. Open one in the schema explorer. (JSON Schema 2020-12) Every request, command and event also carries a request context. (OBSP 0.1 §4.3)
Emits
node-bootstrap-bundleNodeBootstrapBundleplanPlanreplay-batch-resultReplayBatchResultreconciliation-assignmentReconciliationAssignmentcorrection-noticeCorrectionNoticequalification-recordQualificationRecordproof-receiptProofReceiptattestation-resultAttestationResult
Accepts
node-manifestNodeManifestattestation-evidenceAttestationEvidenceobservation-recordObservationRecordreplay-batchReplayBatchobserved-state-receiptObservedStateReceiptreconciliation-receiptReconciliationReceiptprovider-manifestProviderManifestsystem-packSystemPack
Lifecycle and conformance
OBSP-SITE 10 of 12 functions. (OBSP 0.1 §7.1) A level is reached only with the evidence it names. (OBSP 0.1 §7.2)
| Clause | Stage | In OBSP-SITE | Contract |
|---|---|---|---|
| §5.1 | Join | Yes | Contracted |
| §5.2 | Admit | Yes | Contracted |
| §5.3 | Describe | Yes | Contracted |
| §5.4 | Time | Yes | Contracted |
| §5.5 | Observe | Yes | Contracted |
| §5.6 | Qualify | Yes | Contracted |
| §5.7 | Federate | No | Open gap G-FED-1 |
| §5.8 | Orchestrate | Yes | Open gap G-ORCH-1 |
| §5.9 | Correct | Yes | Contracted |
| §5.10 | Exchange | No | Open gap G-EXCH-1 |
| §5.11 | Prove | Yes | Open gap G-PROVE-1 |
| §5.12 | Exit and decommission | Yes | Contracted |
Conformance cases that apply
| Case | What it tests | Kind | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| CT-NODE-001 | Join: node manifest, attestation evidence and the verifier's result | invariant | node-manifest attestation-evidence attestation-result request-context |
| CT-NODE-002 | Join: bootstrap bundle received from the site cell | schema | node-bootstrap-bundle |
| CT-NODE-003 | Describe: sensor passports and the calibration records they cite | invariant | sensor-passport calibration-record |
| CT-NODE-004 | Time: time quality reported as explicit state | invariant | time-quality |
| CT-NODE-005 | Observe: observation records and event envelopes | schema | observation-record event-envelope |
| CT-NODE-006 | Observe: store and forward replay with its result | schema | replay-batch replay-batch-result |
| CT-NODE-007 | Qualify: quality flags and provenance travel with values | schema | quality-flag provenance |
| CT-NODE-008 | Orchestrate: a signed plan applied with a reconciliation receipt | schema | plan reconciliation-receipt observed-state-receipt |
| CT-NODE-009 | Exit: decommission with revoked identities and a full export | invariant | decommission-record |
| CT-SITE-001 | Admit: sources admitted by manifest and qualification record | schema | source-manifest qualification-record |
| CT-SITE-002 | Correct: correction notices supersede with a new digest | invariant | correction-notice |
| CT-SITE-003 | Prove: proof receipts for the local verifier role | schema | proof-receipt |
Run these cases in the onboarding check
Levels
- Declared
- Signed self-declaration naming profile, version and scope.
- Self-tested
- Conformance report (obsp conformance run) produced by the participant, with digests of the tested artifacts.
- Lab-tested
- Conformance report (obsp conformance run) and lab test record from a qualified lab.
- Qualified
- Lab report plus field observation for the declared scope and a qualification-record.
- Suspended
- Suspension notice with reason.
- Withdrawn
- Withdrawal notice.
Identity, attestation and security
Requirements of the join function and of the security model. (OBSP 0.1 §5.1; OBSP 0.1 §8) Attestation follows the RATS architecture, passport model. (IETF RFC 9334 §5.1)
- A node MUST present attestation evidence (RATS, RFC 9334, passport model) rooted in a hardware root of trust where the device class has one (TPM 2.0, DICE or a secure element), or a software root explicitly marked SOFTWARE_ROOT otherwise. (OBSP 0.1 §5.1)
- A verifier MUST bind the result to a nonce and an expiry. (OBSP 0.1 §5.1)
- Identity MUST be short-lived and renewable (X.509 SVID, SPIFFE-style URI spiffe://<trust-domain>/node/<uni>). (OBSP 0.1 §5.1)
- Long-lived shared secrets MUST NOT be used. (OBSP 0.1 §5.1)
- The bootstrap bundle MUST be signed by the site cell's enrolment key and carry the trust anchors, policy reference and the first plan digest. (OBSP 0.1 §5.1)
Root-of-trust classes the attestation evidence schema accepts: TPM2, DICE, SECURE_ELEMENT, SOFTWARE_ROOT. (OBSP 0.1 §5.1)
A hardware root follows TPM 2.0 or DICE where the device class has one. (TCG TPM 2.0; TCG DICE)
- Architecture
- Zero trust (NIST SP 800-207): every request is authenticated, authorised and logged; network position grants nothing (OBSP 0.1 §8)
- Device identity
- Attested; hardware root where the class has one; short-lived certificates; revocation within the site cell's offline window (OBSP 0.1 §8)
- Workload identity
- SPIFFE-style SVIDs, rotated; no shared secrets (OBSP 0.1 §8)
- Keys
- Site cell keys held by the grid operator; customer-held keys for upstream services; HSM or TPM-sealed where available (OBSP 0.1 §8)
- Supply chain
- SBOM, SLSA provenance, signed artifacts, TUF update metadata, SUIT for firmware (OBSP 0.1 §8)
- Time
- Authenticated time (P3, §5.4); time integrity gates receipts (OBSP 0.1 §8)
- OT environments
- IEC 62443 zones and conduits for industrial deployments (OBSP 0.1 §8)
- Privacy
- Observation data that can identify a person is a declared data class with its own policy; default is not to collect it (OBSP 0.1 §8)
Interoperability profile and standards
The primary standards this type draws on. Alignment with a standard is stated as alignment. It is not an approval by the standards body. (OBSP 0.1 §13)
- NIST SP 800-207Zero Trust Architecture(NIST SP 800-207)
- SPIFFESecure Production Identity Framework for Everyone(SPIFFE)
- TUFThe Update Framework(TUF)
- in-totoin-toto supply chain framework(in-toto)
- SLSA 1.0Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts(SLSA 1.0)
- ISA/IEC 62443Security for industrial automation and control systems(ISA/IEC 62443)
Not yet defined
What the protocol does not define for this type in version 0.1, stated as the specification states it. Nothing here is filled in from elsewhere.
- The proof verifier is an open gap in OBSP 0.1 (G-PROVE-1). (OBSP 0.1 §9)
G-ORCH-1Plan signing path and TUF update metadata (Orchestrate). (OBSP 0.1 §9)G-PROVE-1Proof challenge protocol and verifier service (Prove). (OBSP 0.1 §9)
Across the consortium
Related pages on the consortium's other networks, in their own words.
- Standards
- Open standards to identify, describe, verify and cite risk information, which observations bound by the protocol can carry.Early Warning and Anticipatory ActionHazards and Disaster Risk ReductionCities and the Built EnvironmentCommunities, Learning and ContributionIndustry, Trade and Supply ChainsWater and Food SystemsHumanitarian Action and DevelopmentData and EvidenceClimate and Earth SystemsEnergy and Critical InfrastructureOpen Infrastructure and Developers
- Index
- Country risk indicators that observations with provenance and quality can inform.risksindex.com
- Academy
- Training for implementers and operators of observing systems.risksacademy.com
- Reports
- Published evidence with provenance, citation and corrections.nexustandards.com/nexus-reports
References
Sources cited on this page, in order of first citation. Addresses were last checked on the date shown.
- OBSP 0.1 §3: Participant roles Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
- OBSP 0.1 §2: Principles (normative) Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
- OBSP 0.1 §5.1: Join Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
- OBSP 0.1 §7.1: Profiles Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
- OBSP 0.1 §6: Wire bindings Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
- in-toto in-toto supply chain framework in-toto.io/ Checked
- SLSA 1.0 Supply-chain Levels for Software Artifacts slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/ Checked
- IETF SCITT Supply Chain Integrity, Transparency and Trust working group datatracker.ietf.org/wg/scitt/about/ Checked
- JSON Schema 2020-12 JSON Schema draft 2020-12 json-schema.org/draft/2020-12 Checked
- OBSP 0.1 §4.3: Request context Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
- OBSP 0.1 §7.2: Conformance levels Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
- OBSP 0.1 §8: Security model Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
- IETF RFC 9334 Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9334.html Checked
- TCG TPM 2.0 Trusted Platform Module Library Specification trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-library-specification/ Checked
- TCG DICE Device Identifier Composition Engine architectures trustedcomputinggroup.org/work-groups/dice-architectures/ Checked
- OBSP 0.1 §13: Sovereign deployment for every operator and environment Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.
- NIST SP 800-207 Zero Trust Architecture csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/207/final Checked
- SPIFFE Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone spiffe.io/docs/latest/spiffe-about/overview/ Checked
- TUF The Update Framework theupdateframework.io/ Checked
- ISA/IEC 62443 Security for industrial automation and control systems www.isa.org/standards-and-publications/isa-standards/isa-iec-62443-series-of-standards Checked
- OBSP 0.1 §9: Gaps register Observatory Protocol 0.1 (draft), CC BY 4.0.